

**Combined agency emergency response protocol**

**(caerp)**



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| **Title of document:** | Combined Agency Emergency Response Protocol (CAERP) |

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| **Lead Agency:** | LRF Training and Exercising Task & Finish Group |

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**Distribution**

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
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
Details of changes should be sent to:

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**JESIP Commander Aide Memoire**





**Major Incident Aide Memoire**

**National Coordinating Centres**

**DCLG operations Centre Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED)**

**Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)**

Recovery Coordinating Group

Strategic Analysis (PESTLE/STEEPLE)

SCC

SCG

**Strategic**

**COMMANDER**

STAC

**Tactical COMMANDER**

TCC

TCG

**JESIP Principles**

**CO-LOCATE**

**COMMUNICATE**

**COORDINATE**

**JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK**

**SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

**OPERATIONAL**

**COMMANDERS**

Police

Fire

Ambulance

**Initial Operational allocated roles**

* Scene Commander
* Traffic Manager
* Cordons
* Outer Scene
* Neighbourhood
* Evacuation
* MDRM
* Welfare
* Specialist Tactical Advisors

**Additional allocated roles**

* Ambulance Loading Point Officer
* Casualty Clearing Station
* RVP Officer
* Vehicle Marshall
* Access route Officer
* Inner Cordon
* Outer Cordon
* Strategic / Tactical Holding Area
* SuRC Manager
* FFRC Manager
* Hospital Documentation Manager
* Media Services
* Heath and Safety Officer

* Mutual Aid
* Specialist Capabilities

**M** Major Incident Declared

**E** Exact Location

**T** Type of Incident

**H** Hazards present or suspected

**A** Access – safe routes

**N** Number, type, severity of casualties

**E** Emergency services present and required

**STEP 123** **PLUS** Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel

**Incident / Event: No notice / Rising Tide**

**TITLE AND OWNERSHIP**

This document is entitled the Combined Agency Emergency Response Protocol and can be known by its acronym ‘CAERP’. This is version seven of CAERP with the LRF having completed a review process June 2014 and June 2016

It has been produced by the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum (LRF). The LRF has the rights of ownership of this document, with publication and distribution being agreed by the LRF members. No amendment, replication or distribution of this protocol is permitted without the express agreement of the LRF.

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Individual partner agencies may produce this document on their individual websites. Permission is granted to those agencies to copy and print the contents of the document by the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum. This LRF has a website available at <http://www.dcisprepared.org.uk>

**PROTECTIVE MARKING**

This document is subject to an OFFICIAL protective marking classification and is suitable for disclosure under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act.

**REVIEW and AMENDMENT**

A review of this document will take place every two years, led by the LRF capability lead for Training and Exercising and updates will be issued. Each agency must notify the LRF Coordinator of any amendments or additions they seek to have included. These can be sent by e-mail to – [lrf@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk](mailto:lrf@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk)

**EQUALITY and DIVERSITY**

The importance of delivering services which meet the needs of different communities within the LRF and ensuring no-one is discriminated against is essential from both a legal and moral point of view. Responders should remain mindful and respectful of individuals’ human rights and must also recognise the importance of taking into account the full range of equality strands including Race/Ethnicity, Disability, Gender (including Gender re-assignment and Transgender, pregnancy and breastfeeding mothers, marital and civil partnership status), age, sexual Orientation, Religion and Belief and ensuring that these needs and circumstances are considered.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this document is to provide a framework for the co-ordinated delivery of effective and efficient integrated emergency management arrangements within the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LRF area. It is applicable to Category 1 and 2 responders (as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004), during an emergency in this LRF. It describes the agreed procedures and joint arrangements for the effective co-ordination of an incident and should be regarded as overarching guidance.

The CAERP is the protocol by which all emergencies (as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) are managed within this LRF area. It provides the underpinning principles for the development of all contingency plans in our LRF area. It is also intended to summarise the roles and responsibilities of organisations during a major incident and outlines how the responding organisations will work collectively for the overall benefit of the public. This also incorporates the support role offered by other organisations.

The document has been written to give an overarching concept of how the LRF works towards Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), where, when, why and what each agency or organisation contributes to the overall response or recovery

The CAERP is consistent with the Cabinet Office document Emergency Response and Recovery (October 2013), and the ACPO Authorised Professional Practice – Civil Contingencies (October 2012) including Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). Representatives of Category 2 Responders who are required to co-operate and share information with Category 1 Responders and other appropriate agencies, including the voluntary sector, will be invited to participate in the work of the LRF through the various capability work streams and/or task and finish groups.

It is recognised that every major incident is different and has its own unique factors and as such, this document does not seek to replace the emergency response arrangements of each Service, merely enhance and reinforce the coordinated approach.

Should you require further information on the content of this publication, contact the LRF Coordinator.

The Civil Contingencies Act is available to view on the gov.uk website.

**1.1 Linked Documents**

This guidance must be read in conjunction with:

* [The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the ‘CCA’)](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents)
* [Cabinet Office Emergency Response and Recovery v5 Oct 2013](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-response-and-recovery)
* [Cabinet Office Emergency Preparedness](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness)
* [‘Responding to Emergencies – the UK Central Government Response: Concept of Operations’](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations)
* [UK National Resilience Planning Assumptions](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/risk-assessment-how-the-risk-of-emergencies-in-the-uk-is-assessed)
* [UK National Risk Assessment](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/risk-assessment-how-the-risk-of-emergencies-in-the-uk-is-assessed)
* [UK Civil Protection Lexicon](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon)
* [Cabinet Office Emergency Responder Interoperability Common Map Symbols](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-common-map-symbols)
* [Operation Link](https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/documents/LRF%20Operation%20Link%20Cascade%20Plan%20v2.3%20(24.03.15).docx?id=a51f39b0-acf7-4199-8e3d-321d924f01ae)
* [DCIOS Strategic Coordination Centre Plan](https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/documents/LRF%20SCC%20PLAN%20V1.0%2025.08.15.docx?id=ea0e05dc-a72a-40f5-858c-5cbddf167864)
* [LRF Major Incident Media Framework](https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/documents/LRF%20Major%20Incident%20Media%20Framework%20v4.1(07.09.11).doc?id=d1b50816-165e-42e9-b884-0eca3016b490)
* [JESIP Joint Doctrine](http://www.jesip.org.uk/joint-doctrine)
* DCIOS Strategic holding Area plan

Other plans are available to registered users at [ResilienceDirect](https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home)

2. CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT 2004

The CCA provides legislation to ensure that multi-agency working takes place to identify and mitigate the risk of emergencies occurring and to provide a joined up approach in response to those that occur.

The CCA requires responders to work collectively and in collaboration as part of a coherent multi-agency effort to ensure that civil protection and resilience arrangements are integrated both within the between organisations and agencies.

2.1 Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum (DCIOS LRF)

The principle mechanism for multi-agency cooperation under the CCA in England is the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), based on police force areas. DCIOS LRF is based in Devon and Cornwall Police area. LRFs are not organisations or legal entities but processes for achieving multi-agency cooperation.

The defined strategic aim of DCIOS LRF is:

To co-ordinate an effective and efficient Integrated Emergency Management protocol within the Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly LRF area.

2.2 LRF Structure

In order to support the work of the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum, the business management takes place once a month through the LRF Monthly on Thursdays (MoT) meeting. The MoT has an open invite to all Category 1 Responders, Category 2 Responders and other agencies involved with the LRF. The aim of the MoT is to manage the working detail of the LRF and discuss in advance and in more detail proposals to be taken to the LRF Chief Officer Group (COG) for their decision and ratification. It provides a process at the tactical and operational level through which multi-agency planning can be delivered effectively.

Delivery takes place below the MoT via task & finish groups led by capability leads. Capability leads are appropriate Category 1 and Category 2 representatives that chair the groups and report directly to the MoT. The ‘Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LRF Strategic Framework’ document gives further detail on the process.

2.3 Category 1 and 2 Responders

2.3.1 The CCA provides for two types of responder – Category 1 and Category 2.

Category 1 Responders are:

|  |
| --- |
| Police |
| British Transport Police (BTP) |
| Fire and Rescue Services |
| Ambulance NHS Trusts |
| Local Authorities (LAs) |
| Environment Agency (EA) |
| Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) |
| Secretary of State |
| NHS England |
| Public Health England (PHE) |
| NHS Acute Trusts |
| Port Health Authorities |

Category 1 Responders have the following duties under the CCA:

* Assess local risks and use this to inform emergency planning
* Put in place emergency plans
* Put in place business continuity management arrangements
* Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of emergency
* Share information with local responders to enhance coordination
* Cooperate with other local responders to enhance coordination and efficiency; and
* Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (Local Authorities only)

**2.3.2** Category 2 Responders are:

|  |
| --- |
| Utilities – Electricity, Gas, Water, Sewerage, Public communications providers |
| Transport – Network Rail, Train Operating Companies (TOCs) |
| Airports, Harbours, Ports |
| Highways England (HE) |
| Health and Safety Executive (HSE) |
| NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) |

Category 2 Responders have the following duties under the CCA:

* Cooperate with Category 1 Responders
* Share relevant information

Category 1 and 2 responders must give due regard to the voluntary sector organisations when planning for and responding to emergencies.

**3.** **EMERGENCIES**

An emergency is:

|  |
| --- |
| An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK |
| An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK |
| War or terrorism which threatens serious damage to human welfare only of it involves, causes or may cause |

An event or situation threatens damage to human welfare only if it involves causes or may cause:

|  |
| --- |
| Loss of Human life |
| Human illness or injury |
| Homelessness |
| Damage to property |
| Disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel |
| Disruption of a system of communication |
| Disruption of facilities for transport |
| Disruption of services relating to health |

An event or situation threatens damage to the environment only if it involves, causes or may cause:

|  |
| --- |
| Contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter |
| Disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life |

**4. MAJOR INCIDENTS**

A Major Incident is defined in the Cabinet Office Emergency Response and Recovery publication as:

“An event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services’ major incident plans”.

The guidance also clarifies that the word ‘Incident’ and ‘Emergency’ are one of the same and are interchangeable.

A major incident is any event or situation that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of; the emergency services, NHS, local authorities, environment agency, maritime coastguard agency, highways agency, utility companies, transport companies and the voluntary agencies. It will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people and may require:

|  |
| --- |
| The involvement of other agencies and organisations |
| The initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties |
| Handling a large number of enquiries |
| Large scale combined resources of two or more emergency services |
| Mobilising and organising emergency services and partner organisations to cater for the possibility of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people |

**4.1 Declaration of a Major Incident**

A major incident may be declared by any of the Category 1 responders who consider that any of the criteria outlined in 3.1 above have been satisfied. Although what requires a Major Incident response may be different for each organisation, any declared Major Incident should be treated as such and responded to appropriately by all Responders until such time as it is proven not to be.

In certain cases, particularly progressive emergencies, some responder organisations may use ‘Major Incident Standby’. A signal that there is significant potential for escalation and as a result certain preparatory measures should be implemented. The use of Major Incident Standby can allow greater flexibility particularly where an emergency may be a Major Incident for one responder organisation and not another. Consideration should be given to calling a PEAT where ‘Major Incident Standby’ is declared (see section 3.4)

In some circumstances the emergency may go beyond the immediate local area and be considered a regional or national emergency. In such circumstances a Minister of the Crown may declare a State of Emergency and may empower a regional co-ordination structure.

**4.2 Stages**

The police normally coordinate the activities of the emergency services and other responding agencies to sudden impact (spontaneous) incidents. These are incidents that occur with a minimum or no notice of warning. The impact on the LRF is immediate and can increase rapidly. Examples of sudden impact incidents are terrorist attacks, aircraft or rail incidents.

The activity that takes place following a Major Incident can be considered in terms of two interlocking processes:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Response | Activity to assess, contain and mitigate the emergency |
| Recovery | Activity to address the consequences of the emergency and emergency response and to return the affected community and environment to a healthy condition |

The response to any emergency or major incident needs to be managed flexibly and depends on the circumstances. Eight guiding principles underpin the response to all incidents.

**Preparedness** – ensuring all those individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies are properly prepared, including clarity of roles and responsibilities.

**Continuity** – ensuring the response to emergencies is grounded in existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working.

**Subsidiarity** – ensuring that decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination taking place at the highest level necessary.

**Direction** – ensuring that clarity of purpose is delivered through a strategic aim and that supporting objectives are agreed and understood by all.

**Integration** – ensuring coordination is exercised between and within organisations and tiers of response, as well as timely access to appropriate guidance and appropriate support for the local or regional level.

**Communication** – effective two-way communication, passing on reliable information correctly and without delay to those who need to know.

**Cooperation** – ensuring positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding, to facilitate information sharing and delivery of solutions.

**Anticipation** – risk identification and analysis of potential direct or indirect development, to anticipate and manage consequences.

The response process consists of the following phases:

Reaction, Rescue, Retrieval (and investigation)

Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

|  |
| --- |
| Initial Response |
| Consolidation Phase |
| Recovery Phase |
| Restoration of Normality |



Every major incident will be uniquely different from all previous emergencies; it is unlikely that a major incident will involve a linear progression through each of the stages; it is acknowledged that stages are likely to overlap and each will require very different levels of activity and effort dependant on the emergency.

Planning for recovery should begin at the same time as, or as soon after the response is established. The transition from response to recovery is a formal and defined process in the form of a hand-over certificate (see Appendix A) signed by the Strategic Coordinating Group Chair and the Chair of any Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) – this will normally be a senior representative of the lead Local Authority. In certain circumstances for example a complex incident or area event the hand over may take the form of a staged approach.

For further information:

[HM Government Emergency Response and Recovery October 2013](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf)

The above guidance aims to establish good practice based on lessons identified from responding to and recovering from emergencies both in the UK and internationally.

It accompanies [Emergency Preparedness](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness) which provides guidance on how to implement the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) regime (including guidance on risk assessment, emergency and business continuity planning, communicating with the public, co-ordination, information sharing and for local authorities only, business continuity promotion). The Emergency Response and Recovery guidance aims to further develop:

* a shared understanding of the multi-agency framework for emergency response and recovery at the local level, and the roles and responsibilities of individual organisations
* a shared understanding of the role of local and national levels in emergency response, and how they will work together
* a common frame of reference, especially concepts and language, for those involved in responding to emergencies.

**4.3 Major Incident notification and Operation LINK**

DCIOS LRF will activate Operation LINK, a cascade process which ensures that all relevant partner organisations are notified of an incident. It is the means by which LRF partners can quickly establish contact with each other. The nature of the incident will determine which organisations are contacted. Those contacted can share and assess information through a Pre-Event Assessment Teleconference (PEAT), TCG or a SCG.

It can be activated either when a Major Incident is declared or in anticipation of such a declaration. Examples including:

* forecasts of adverse weather (including flood warnings)
* where the health of the public is at risk from any cause
* significant road traffic collisions
* incidents where community evacuation / public disorder may result

Any agency that is represented on the LRF is able to use this protocol (with suitable delegated authority within their organisation) but it should only be initiated in response to the circumstances outlined above.

A Pre Event Assessment Teleconference (PEAT) takes place for most rising tide incidents. A PEAT is an informal telecommunication between the Police (Chair) and a small group of relevant partners appropriate to the type of incident.

Attendance should not normally be any higher than an emergency planning practitioner/manager who will have the knowledge to make the judgement to move to a more formal stance (TCG and/or SCG).

The Police will co-ordinate the PEAT and contact the appropriate partners using the LRF Emergency Callout List. A senior member of the Police Emergency Planning Unit team will lead the PEAT call.

If there is not sufficient information to move to a formal stance then a further PEAT should be scheduled if necessary.

To avoid confusion, all PEATs are to be co-ordinated by the Police.

**5. CATEGORY 1 AND 2 RESPONDERS – KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

The Police will lead the coordination of the response to most major incidents, particularly sudden impact emergencies and weather-related incidents such as flooding. The response to some other emergencies may possibly be co-ordinated by other agencies, examples include:

* The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and Local Authorities lead co-ordination of maritime pollution emergencies
* The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) are the lead co-ordinating agency for search and rescue operations on the cliffs and shoreline of the UK
* Public Health England leads for public health outbreaks
* The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) leads for animal health outbreaks

**CATEGORY 1 RESPONDERS**

**5.1 Police**

When responding to an emergency or major incident, the police objectives are:

* saving and protecting human life
* maintaining public order and the rule of law
* preventing, deterring and detecting crime
* securing the scene
* coordinating the multi-agency response
* containing the emergency (limiting its escalation or spread)
* providing warnings, advice and information
* managing the media
* facilitating investigations and inquiries
* protecting the health and safety of responding personnel
* protecting property
* maintaining or restoring critical activities
* maintaining normal services at an appropriate level
* managing traffic arrangements
* clarifying the role and responsibilities of other investigative agencies
* supporting HM Coroner
* safeguarding the environment
* facilitating the Recovery process to restore and rebuild the community
* evaluating the Response phase
* identifying and taking action to implement lessons learned

**5.2 Fire and Rescue Services**

The primary areas of Fire & Rescue Service responsibility at a major incident are:

* Life-saving through search and rescue and the release of trapped casualties
* Preventing further escalation of the incident by tackling fires, dealing with released chemicals and other hazardous situations (including information retrieval)
* Information gathering and hazard assessment to give advice to the police and enable them to advise the public to shelter or evacuate
* Liaison with the police regarding the provision of a cordon around the immediate hazard area to enable the Fire and Rescue Service to exercise control
* Safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon (except in terrorist or firearms-related incidents)
* Liaison with the Ambulance Incident Commander and the Medical Incident Commander (if present) with regard to providing assistance at ambulance loading points and the priority evacuation of injured casualties
* Detection, identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials (including information retrieval)
* Protecting the environment
* Salvage and damage control
* Participating in investigations as appropriate and preparing reports and evidence for inquiries
* Stand-by during the non-emergency phases to ensure the continued safety of personnel and the site, if necessary

**5.3 Ambulance**

In a major incident with immediate casualties the Ambulance Service is the gatekeeper to other NHS services. It will usually be the first NHS responding organisation on the scene and will decide where casualties should be taken, provide immediate triage, treatment and transport, and will provide on-site coordinated communications for all NHS disciplines.

The key strategic responsibilities of South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust are to: -

* Save life, in conjunction with the other Emergency Services
* Instigate a health command and control structure
* Protect the health, safety and welfare of all Health Service personnel on site
* Coordinate the NHS communications on site and to alert the receiving hospitals for receipt of the injured
* Carry out a Health Service assessment for the incident and alert the wider NHS of the incident (including advance notification to the National Blood Service of any likelihood of increased demands for blood)
* Instigate an effective triage process to determine the priority evacuation and treatment needs of those injured
* Treat casualties
* Transport casualties to hospital
* Provide clinical decontamination of casualties, if required, and to support mass decontamination
* Mobilise the UK national reserve stock, as appropriate
* Alert and coordinate the work of the third sector and private ambulances, enabling them to provide support services as appropriate
* Maintain adequate emergency cover throughout other parts of the Ambulance Service area
* Reduce to a minimum, the disruption of the normal work of the Service

**5.4 Local Authorities**

Local Authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions that are likely to be called on in support of the emergency services during the response phase, in addition to managing their own statutory duties during the response and recovery phases. Crucially, the Local Authority, as the main body representing the community, will lead the recovery phase in exercising community rehabilitation and environmental protection. There are four unitary authorities in the LRF area: Cornwall Council, Plymouth City Council, Torbay Council and the Council of the Isles of Scilly. Unitary Authorities are responsible for all local government functions.

Devon is a two tier authority and consists of the County Council, which is the strategic authority and 8 District Councils – Exeter City, East Devon, Mid Devon, Teignbridge, South Hams, West Devon, North Devon and Torridge, which are responsible for a wide range of more local services. (See next section and Appendix A for ‘Functions and Responsibilities of Local Authorities in Devon and Cornwall’ for breakdown of services provided). The Isles of Scilly is a special authority, identified individually in legislation and has the functions of a Unitary Council plus a statutory Water Authority and environmental regulator. Parish and Town Councils provide a further tier of local government and although they have significant input to the County/District Council planning process, they do not have any statutory duties under the CCA 2004. Local Authorities must be notified through the cascade system when a major incident or emergency is declared and should be informed whenever an emergency is likely to lead to a significant impact on people or the local environment/community. The local authority will play an enabling role in close collaboration with relevant others to:

* Provide shelter, warmth, refreshments and welfare support to evacuees not requiring medical attention in rest centres
* Support the Police in the operation of Survivor and Family and Friends Reception Centres, with the provision of the welfare function
* Assistance to the Police at Evacuation Assembly Points, if required
* Opening of Humanitarian Assistance Centre
* Call out voluntary sector and manage the assistance provided
* Transport for evacuees
* Provide detail of known vulnerable people within the inner/outer cordon
* Maintain as far as possible existing services to the community
* Provide medium to longer-term welfare of survivors and those affected, including social care support and temporary housing
* Address the communities’ on-going needs in the aftermath of an emergency.
* Building Control Inspectors may be able to advise the rescue services on the condition and accessibility of damaged structures (this can involve securing or zoning the building, arranging shoring up, removal of part or all of the building in order to prevent danger and advising services such as the Fire and Rescue Authority on access). In a major emergency involving a number of buildings or structures, the role would be to coordinate these works involving a survey/assessment of each building, instigating the required works and re-inspection prior to allowing access or reoccupation
* Call out voluntary sector and manage the assistance provided
* Lead on Coastal Pollution incidents with the formation of a Shoreline Management Group (SMG) (see 5.7.2)
* Attend the ‘Mass Fatalities Co-ordination Team’, assess and decide on provision of additional emergency mortuary capacity where existing mortuary capacity is likely to be exceeded or result in additional business continuity issues.
* Lead on Recovery, which is likely to carry on for a considerable time and is likely to involve many organisations that are not ordinarily involved with emergency response
* The Director of Public Health (DPH), acting on behalf of the Local Authority, has a pivotal role in protecting the health of its population. They are responsible for the Local Authority’s contribution to health protection matters, including their role in planning for, and responding to incidents that present a threat to the public’s health
* The DPH will provide initial leadership for a range of public health incidents ranging from relatively minor outbreaks to full-scale emergencies. They will work with colleagues from Public Health England to mobilise resources in response to public health incidents and outbreaks and will liaise with NHS England Local Area Teams
* The DPH will also provide advice to Clinical Commissioning Groups and other organisations in their area and ensure that there is effective communication with local communities
* Unitary and County Councils operate a 24/7 call out Duty rota and the Duty Officer will engage other council staff, as required

**5.5 Health Services**

**5.5.1 NHS England (South West)**

NHS England South (South West) provides the strategic leadership for the NHS during emergency incident involving more than one NHS provider. They are the key link between the Department of Health and the NHS in Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.

In a widespread major incident, NHS England will lead the NHS response to the incident within Devon, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly. They work with Local Authorities and other agencies that provide health and social care to make sure the communities’ needs are being met. In a major incident, NHS England will co-ordinate and direct the deployment of NHS resources to meet the healthcare requirements of the incident response and the wider community.

The role of NHS England in a Major Incident is to:

* Lead and co-ordinate the NHS emergency response, when more than one NHS provider is involved
* Mobilise NHS resources across organisational boundaries, as necessary, in support of the response – this includes ensuring healthcare support for evacuees and other vulnerable groups affected by the incident, including replacement medications
* Assess the health impact of an incident on the wider community; lead provider organisations in mitigation of that impact
* Represent the NHS at Strategic Co-ordinating Group meetings and ensure appropriate NHS representation at Tactical Co-ordinating Group meetings
* Co-ordinate communications with other emergency responder organisations
* Escalate to a regional or national response as necessary

**5.5.2 Acute and Foundation Hospital Trusts**

Large Hospitals are managed by NHS Trusts; there are a number of Acute and Foundation Trusts in Devon and Cornwall, who are responsible for the five general hospitals at Treliske (Truro), Derriford (Plymouth), Torbay (Torquay), Royal Devon and Exeter (Exeter) and North Devon District (Barnstaple).

The primary areas of responsibility for Acute Hospitals Trusts during a major incident are to:

* Receive and triage casualties in Accident & Emergency if designated as a receiving Hospital
* Back-up facilities in the rest of the hospital
* Support any designated receiving hospital
* Identify patients requiring transfer to specialist centres, e.g. burns and paediatrics units as appropriate and liaison with those units
* Communicate with family and friends of existing patients and those from the incident, the local community, the media and VIPs
* Provide specialist support at the scene of an incident, only if specifically requested
* Counsel, advise and support, in partnership with other agencies
* Ensure that the hospital continues its entire essential functions and the maintenance, as far as possible, of normal acute health services

The Trust may be called upon to assist in receiving and treating large numbers of repatriated military casualties.

**5.5.3 Public Health England**

Public Health England (PHE) was established in April 2013 as an Executive Agency of the Department of Health. PHE is responsible for:

* Making the public healthier by encouraging discussions, advising Government and supporting action by local government, the NHS and other people and organisations
* Supporting the public so they can protect and improve their own health
* Protecting the nation’s health through the national health protection service, and preparing for public health emergencies
* Sharing information and expertise with Local Authorities, industry and the NHS, to help make improvements in the public’s health
* Researching, collecting and analysing data to improve understanding of health and come up with answers to public health problems
* Reporting on improvements in the public’s health so everyone can understand the challenge and the next steps
* Helping Local Authorities and the NHS to develop the public health system and its specialist workforce

The local response is provided by the Devon, Cornwall and Somerset Public Health England Centre (PHEC). The PHEC is supported by PHE’s specialist divisions including the Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards and the Centre for Emergency Preparedness. PHE also provides specialist expertise at a regional level including epidemiologists and health emergency planners. Devon, Cornwall and Somerset Public Health England Centre (PHEC) provides:

* Public health support and advice to NHS organisations, Local Authorities and also other agencies involved in responding to an incident at a local level
* Impartial and authoritative advice to health professionals, other agencies and the public
* Supports the management of incidents through attendance at the Strategic Coordination Centre, Tactical Coordination Centre and a public health incident group
* Acts as a gateway to specialist PHE advice
* Specialist input to the Science and Technical Advice Cell
* Public health advice and support to the NHS and Local Authority Public Health Teams in monitoring the long-term health effects of an incident

**5.6 Environment Agency**

The Environment Agency plays an important role in preparing for and supporting the response to emergencies in England and Wales. In a flood incident the main roles of the EA are to:-

* Issue warnings to those likely to be affected
* Operate flood defences on certain rivers and coastlines
* Advise the emergency services on the expected level of flooding

In an incident that has or is likely to affect the environment the EA will:

* Provide specialist environmental advice
* Monitor the effects of, and the response to an incident, to minimise the impact on the environment
* Work with the Health Authorities to provide them with advice on environmental impacts, which will assist in their formulation of health advice
* Provide air quality data and advice during a major incident, if necessary activating a National Air Quality Cell to co-ordinate air quality data and provide fast effective public health advice to those managing the incident

An Air Quality Cell (AQC) may be established during a major incident involving air quality, where there is the potential for significant risk to public health. The Environment Agency will contact partner organisations; Health Professionals, Food Standards Agency, Met Office and Health and Safety Laboratory on activation.

The AQC will:

* Deploy monitoring teams to sensitive receptors e.g. hospitals, schools, nursing homes to collect real-time data. This data directly informs the public health risk assessment
* Carry out air dispersion modelling to forecast the nature and scale of the plume and its potential impact on the public at large. Key messages on sheltering, evacuation and wash/peel foodstuffs will be communicated via a regular Summary Report sent directly to the TCG, or the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), for the SCG
* Be operational during the response phase of the incident which is normally up to 3 days
* Coordinate air quality data, including monitoring and modelling during the recovery phase will be handed over to the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

After an incident the EA will:

* Advise on how best to dispose of any waste generated by the incident
* Continue to monitor the impact on the environment
* Provide information to the public on the environmental impact
* Investigate the cause of an incident and take enforcement action as appropriate

**5.7 Maritime and Coastguard Agency**

**5.7.1 HM Coastguard**

HM Coastguard is an on-call emergency organisation responsible for the initiation and coordination of all civilian maritime search and rescue within the UK Maritime Search and Rescue Region. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the UK.

The objectives of HM Coastguard are to:

* Respond to requests for assistance from, or for, vessels or persons in distress or potential distress, including those vessels or persons missing at sea or on the coastline
* Respond in conjunction with the MCA's Counter Pollution and Response Branch to reports of actual or potential threats of maritime pollution
* Use the skills and experience of Coastguard Officers in an accident prevention capacity by providing safety education for professional and recreational mariners, as well as students and children in colleges and schools

**5.7.2 Counter Pollution and Response Branch**

Initial information about an incident is usually reported in the first instance to HM Coastguard (HMCG) by many sources e.g. the vessel in difficulty, passing vessels, observers and the public. HMCG will then instigate search and rescue operations where necessary and this action will hold primacy over any other forms of response. They will also inform the duty Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer (CPSO) if there is any pollution or threat of pollution such as a drifting ship or grounded ship. The CPSO, guided by the National Contingency Plan (NCP), then decides the relevant course of action and instigates the appropriate level of response and alerts relevant people including the Secretary of States Representative (SOSREP).

The NCP sets out a framework for dealing with major pollution incidents that threaten UK interests. The NCP covers pollution by oil or other hazardous and noxious substances, such as chemicals that are liable to create hazards to human health or the marine and shoreline environment. Coordination and control of incidents is undertaken from suitable venues near the scene of the incident where representatives of all authorities and parties involved, can work together as a team. These venues could be a Coastguard operations centre or a port/harbour office. The following groups may be convened to coordinate certain aspects of the incident:

MCA - Marine Emergencies Information Room (MEIR) to act as a focal point and information room in the initial stages of a major incident until the following teams are set up:

* Marine Response Centre (MRC) will consider and implement the most appropriate means of containing, dispersing or neutralising pollutants
* Salvage Control Unit (SCU) is set up to assist SOSREP by considering information available and offering advice to ensure that all reasonable and possible options for a solution are considered
* Operations Control Unit (OCU) - for incidents dealing with offshore installations with similar function to the SCU
* Shoreline Management Group (SMG) - Shoreline Management Group (SMG) – Led by the Local Authority is responsible for over-seeing the shoreline pollution clean-up response for the incident and is the primary point of interface with the Environment Group. The SMG is likely to be chaired by the local authority and reports directly to the Recovery Co-ordination Group. The SMG would direct the operational response at the individual sites through the Beachmaster Command Posts. Subject to the incident the SMG will either work to the RCG or perform the role of the RCG as they functionally operate in the same way.
* Environment Group (EG) provides advice to minimise the impact of the incident on the environment and public health

**5.8 Port Health Authorities**

Port Health Authorities have responsibility for health controls at both seaports and airports. They are responsible for protecting the public and the environment at the ports with the primary objective of preventing the introduction into the country of dangerous infectious diseases via ships and aircraft. They are also responsible for the safety of imported food and controlling the hygiene of shellfish production around the coast. Port health controls are managed in the main by local authorities who employ dedicated Port Health Officers (normally specifically trained Environmental Health Officers), to perform these functions. Local Authority Trading Standards Officers and officers from the Animal Health and Plant Agency (APHA) specifically deal with animal feed issues, live animal imports, rabies controls and imported food waste controls.

**5.9 CATEGORY 2 RESPONDERS**

**5.10 Water and Sewerage Services**

Responsible for the supply and treatment of water for domestic and commercial use. Roles and responsibilities in an emergency include:

* Adjustment of water supply systems to increase the flow of water available to the Fire and Rescue Service
* Provision of scientific support regarding water quality
* Temporary water supplies
* The provision, operation and maintenance of public sewers
* The collection, treatment and disposal of waste water
* Liaison with the Emergency Services, Environment Agency and Local Authorities during water based contamination events involving the disposal of water
* Liaison with health agencies on appropriate measures to mitigate risks to public health
* Scientific support relating to waste water quality

**5.11 Electricity Distribution**

Western Power Distribution (WPD) has an obligation to cooperate with Category 1 responders to plan for emergencies and meet the needs of those who may be vulnerable in emergencies. WPD is an electricity distribution network operator and responsible for operating the electricity network of overhead lines, underground cables, poles, pylons and substations. They also have a statutory requirement to co-operate with Local Authorities in planning for an emergency incident on the High Pressure pipeline network that feeds the low pressure end user network. They are responsible for operating and maintaining the underground pipeline networks and Above Ground Installations (AGI’s), throughout Devon and Cornwall.

**5.12 Gas Distribution**

National Grid and Wales, West Utilities and Centrica Energy (Langage Energy Centre) have an obligation to co-operate with Category 1 responders to plan for emergencies and meet the needs of those who may be vulnerable in emergencies. They also have a statutory requirement to co-operate with Local Authorities in planning for an emergency incident on the High Pressure pipeline network that feeds the low pressure end user network. They are responsible for operating and maintaining the underground pipeline networks and Above Ground Installations (AGI’s), throughout Devon and Cornwall.

**5.13 Network Rail**

Network Rail owns and operates the rail infrastructure of Great Britain. Maintenance is the core activity of the network operator and its main responsibilities are:

* Responsible for the operation of the railway network
* Provides the focal point of liaison at all rail incidents (Rail Incident Officer )
* Responsible for providing technical and safety advice and information for the responding agencies at a rail incident
* Assist and advise on the establishment of a safe system of work for incidents on the railway infrastructure
* To conduct investigations into incidents on the Network Rail infrastructure where appropriate

**5.14 Train Operating Companies (TOC)**

Passenger train services are operated by a number of companies referred to as Train Operating Companies (TOC), normally on the basis of regional franchises awarded by the Department for Transport. Most of the trains used to operate the passenger services are owned by a small number of rolling stock companies (ROSCO) and are leased to the individual TOCs. However, a handful of TOC’s own and maintain some of their own rolling stock. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) is the coordinating body of the TOC’s and provides a commonality and centralised coordination for the TOC’s. A Train Operating Company will:

* Be responsible for passengers and their families in the aftermath of a rail accident
* Provide specialist information and advice for any of their trains involved in an accident
* Liaise with the Emergency Services with regards to support the Survivor Reception Centres and Family and Friends Reception Centres
* Liaise with the Local Authority with regards to the supporting the Rest Centre
* Provide response staff throughout the area concerned

**5.14.1 Rail Incident Care Teams**

Rail Incident Care Teams are Category 2 responders under the CCA 2004. Their volunteers, drawn from the individual train operating companies, have been specially trained and equipped to provide humanitarian support and assistance to those directly affected by major train incidents. They will work closely with the local authorities, acute hospitals and the police (with particular regard to the arrangements and procedures relating to Police Family Liaison deployment).

**5.15 Highways England**

Highways England roles and responsibilities on motorways and all purpose trunk roads are to:

* Monitor traffic using CCTV, on-road patrols and automated systems
* Respond to incidents and provide traffic management
* Remove debris and broken down vehicles from the road
* Implement diversion routes when roads are closed
* Set both local and strategic Variable Message Signs (VMS) to provide information to the public

**5.16 Health and Safety Executive**

The Health and Safety Executive will:

* Provide specialist advice in respect of the health and safety risks to responders and others as a result of an emergency
* Provide specialist advice about appropriate control measures to prevent or reduce the risks of exposure, including engineering controls and personal protective equipment
* Inspection of plant, equipment and processes in industry
* Instigation of statutory investigations post incident as to cause and possible future preventative measures
* Monitoring all safety aspects at industrial sites
* Offer advice to Emergency Services
* Liaison with Police to prevent removal or plant or other material, which may be required at a later date
* In conjunction with surveyors and site personnel, determine when on-site buildings and other parts of the site, together with off-site areas if they have been affected, may be safe to re-enter

**5.17 Clinical Commissioning Groups**

Clinical Commissioning Groups will provide support to NHS England in co-ordinating the Health response to any emergency incident. They will do so by:

* mobilising provider resources as requested by NHS England in support of the emergency response
* working with NHS providers to ensure the delivery of healthcare to the wider community through-out any emergency incident
* if asked to do so, represent NHS England and the wider NHS at Tactical Co-ordinating Group meetings

**OTHER DCIOS LRF PARTNERS**

**5.18 Met Office**

The Met Office is the official source of meteorological information in the UK. The weather can be the cause of an emergency and/or have a major influence on its impact, such as in chemical releases, nuclear incidents, large fires or biological hazards, including Foot and Mouth Disease. Legislation supporting the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 states that Category 1 Responders must have regard to the Met Office’s duty to warn the public and provide information and advice, if an emergency is likely to occur or has taken place. The Met Office’s Public Weather Service (PWS) provides a number of services to help authorities prepare for, and respond to emergencies – from making informed decisions in their day-to-day activities (to optimise or mitigate the impact of the weather) and contribute to the protection of life, property and basic infrastructure.

The primary areas of Met Office responsibility during a major incident are to:

* Provide in advance and during a severe weather event – National Severe Weather Warning Service (NSWWS). These weather warnings may be issued separately or a combination for rain, wind, snow, ice and fog. Warnings are issued when significant disruption to transport and communications is expected, but the main driver is the potential risk to life and property. They are then updated as appropriate
* Supply and provide in advance and during a severe weather event Met Office Advisors services – giving interpretation and impact of the weather via email, teleconference, in person at SCG or STAC as appropriate. Normal working hours are Monday to Friday 0900-1730 hrs – but they can be flexible in their workload to accommodate major incidents requirements
* Supply and provide specialist short-notice UK and global forecasts and advice from the Hazard Centre and Ops Centre forecasters – including for chemical fires (CHEMETs), radiological releases (PACRAMs), large fires, biological hazards, release of a hazardous substance in waters around the UK, volcanic eruptions in Iceland and specialised weather forecasts for site of emergency incident; all via a variety of delivery platforms including web, email and text. Operational capability 24 hours a day, 365 days a year – allowing Hazard Centre forecasters to also cover for Met Office Advisors – when they are not available
* Supply and provide in advance and during a flooding event from the Flood Forecasting Centre (FFC) – forecasts and warnings of all sources of flooding such as river, surface, tidal/coastal and groundwater. The two most common services are the daily FGS (Flood Guidance Statement) and HRAs (Heavy Rain Alerts)
* Provide in advance and during a Heat wave event (criteria for SW England: 30C/15C/30C), from 1 June to 15 September inclusive with Department of Health – Heat wave Plan comprising of Heat Health Planning forecast and Heat Health Watch alerts and Met Office Advisor updates at Level 2 or above
* Provide in advance and during a Cold Weather event (criteria for SW England: average temperature of 2C or less for at least 48 hours), or an anticipated warning for heavy snow or widespread ice – from 1 November to 31 March inclusive with Department of Health – Cold Weather Plan comprising Cold Weather Alert Planning Advice and Cold Weather Alerts and Met Office Advisor updates at Level 2 or above
* Supply Hazard Manager – to registered Category 1 and Category 2 users – an up-to-date 24/7 web portal which is a one stop shop for Met Office weather data and information – both latest and forecast – along with Flood Forecasting Centre (FFC) flood risk information and Fire met. It aims to supplement the Met Office Advisors in providing consistent weather-related information and interpretation to responders
* Keep the general public up to date on potential and happening severe weather – using weather forecasts and warnings – through a variety of delivery platforms in collaboration with partners when relevant, including the web, mobile including apps, text, email, social media, broadcast media and press media

**5.19 Central Government**

Central Government has identified a Lead Government Department (LGD) for all types of emergency. In most cases the initial response to any incident will be led by the Department for Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) who will provide a link between local responders and other Central Government Departments and provide information to the National Coordinating Committee if sitting, commonly known as COBR. DCLG RED will act as the initial Government Liaison Officer (GLO) to the SCC and will continue in this role until they are replaced by a member of the Lead Government Department, although in some cases they will act as GLO for the whole of the incident. DCLG RED will provide initial links with other agencies such as the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and Government Decontamination Service (GDS) but cannot act on their behalf or decide on policy on their behalf.

**5.20 Military**

The Armed Forces do not play a permanent role in local civil protection. Nevertheless, experience shows that they can be useful even essential during the response phase, whether contributing to the response to a local incident or as part of the local response to a regional or national emergency. They also play an important part in certain specific scenarios such as search and rescue, high-risk searching and explosive ordnance disposal. It is therefore important that Category 1 Responders maintain close links with the Armed Forces and this is best done through the Regional Brigade Headquarters – Headquarters 1 Artillery Brigade (HQ 1 Arty Bde) and headquarters South West (HQ SW). Day to day links are maintained through the Armed Forces Joint Regional Liaison Officer, who is a member of the LRF and the initial military focus at the SCG when required. Day to day links should also be maintained with the RAF Regional Liaison Officer for the South West and the RN Regional Liaison Officer (Wales and Western England).

When Military assets are required to provide assistance in specific circumstances, this is known as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).

The following guide provides civil responders with guidance for the defence contribution to resilience in the UK and is designed as a ready guide:

[Operations in the UK: A guide for civil responders 2010](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33700/JDP022EdAddendumWeb.pdf)

**5.21 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)**

Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) is an executive agency working on behalf of the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Scottish Government and Welsh Government. Their role is to safeguard animal health and welfare as well as public health, protect the economy and enhance food security through research, surveillance and inspection. In terms of major incidents and in the event of confirmation of an exotic notifiable animal disease, APHA would work closely with DEFRA and take the lead in the operational aspects of controlling the outbreak. There would be a coordinated approach to disease control and eradication with close working between each country’s administration and operational partners.

APHA/Defra will aim to:

* Protect public health and safety
* Eradicate the disease and regain disease free status
* Safeguard the health and safety of those involved in controlling the outbreak
* Minimise the burden on the taxpayer and public as well as the economic impact on the agricultural industry
* Keep to a minimum the number of animals that have to be destroyed, either for disease control purposes or to safeguard animal welfare
* Ensure that if animals do have to be destroyed it is carried out humanely
* Minimise the adverse impacts on animal welfare, the rural and wider economy, the public, rural communities and the environment

**5.22 Voluntary Organisations**

Several Voluntary Organisations have a means of responding to emergencies quickly by providing additional and sometimes unique support to the Emergency Services, NHS and Local Authorities. This is especially so during the consolidation and recovery phases when Fire, Police, and Ambulance personnel are fully deployed elsewhere.

**5.23 Faith Teams**

Devon and Cornwall have faith teams who can be called upon to deliver practical, pastoral and spiritual help to anyone affected by an emergency, either within the Centres managed or supported by the Local Authority, or at the scene to deliver last rites. Christian chaplains and representatives from across the multi-faith traditions have been trained to respond and support those in need of their care.

**6. ACTIONS BY THE FIRST COMMANDER AT THE SCENE**

The initial assessment of the scene is vital for the effective management of the major incident irrespective of the rank of the first officer to arrive at the scene. It is important to stress that a major incident should be formally declared as soon as any of the criteria are satisfied.

**6.1 Police First Actions**

On arrival at the scene, first responders should:

* consider their own personal safety
* not get involved in rescue activities
* undertake an assessment using the METHANE mnemonic as a guide
* declare a Major Incident if appropriate
* establish rendezvous point/s for incoming personnel
* establish a Forward Command Post (FCP), if safe to do so.
* Consider Operation Link

The primary role of the police at the scene of an emergency or major incident includes:

* creating cordons
* controlling the scene access control points
* identifying and managing rendezvous points (RvPs)
* managing traffic
* identifying and managing marshalling areas

Further guidance is available at:

[College of Policing: Authorised Professional Practice](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/civil-contingencies/emergency-procedures/)

**6.2 Fire and Rescue Services First Actions**

The first officer to arrive at the incident will assume the role of Fire Incident Commander. They must not become personally involved in rescue or fire fighting efforts. The initial call to an incident may not carry sufficient information to identify the call as a Major Incident; the initial Incident Commander will assess the situation and report by priority radio message to the Control Room. This message will include the phrase “Major Incident” and a METHANE update.

The Incident Commander will ensure that the Command Support function maintains radio contact with the Control Room. The Incident Commander will take all necessary measures to:

* Assess the effectiveness or fire fighting or other measures carried out before their arrival
* Identify the risks associated with the location, including those details held on the Service’s database
* Conduct a dynamic risk assessment to ensure the safety of all responding personnel within the scene of operations
* Form a plan of action to deal with the developing situation
* Decide on appropriate additional resources
* Take effective command and issue instructions to effect the plan of action
* Maintain tactical command of the fire fighting and rescue operations within the inner cordon
* Evaluation the situation and any potential for development and prepare to brief a more senior officer on the incident
* Liaise with other agency Incident Commanders at the earliest opportunity and provide an incident and safety briefing

**6.3 Ambulance First Actions**

The first ambulance may arrive on scene before an Ambulance Officer. In such cases, the Attendant will assume the role of Ambulance Incident Commander (AIC). The crew will not become involved in treating casualties but will initiate command and control of the medical response. The following procedures should be adopted: -

* Report arrival on scene to Ambulance Control
* Conduct an immediate visual risk assessment of the scene
* Confirm incident appears to be a ‘Major Incident’, if unsure Attendant may declare ‘Major Incident Standby’
* Provide Ambulance Control with a detailed report. The mnemonic METHANE is used to assist with determining the speed and adequacy of the required information
* Request Ambulance/Medical resources required pending the arrival of the Ambulance Incident Commander
* Liaise with other agencies and assist in setting up the Incident Control Post
* The Attendant should continue to act as AIC until relieved by a senior nominated officer. Upon arrival the Ambulance Incident Officer may initiate the ‘Major Incident Medical Management and Support’ (MIMMS) procedures and establish the necessary ‘key roles’. The AIC should also consider the need for a Medical Incident Officer, Medical Teams and Incident Support Units

**6.4 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (Maritime and Shoreline Incidents)**

Whilst every effort will be made to send a regular Coastguard officer to the scene, it maybe that the only Coastguard presence will be a Coastguard Rescue Officer who will be totally committed to the rescue. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is organised such that the senior officer will always proceed to the nearest Coastguard Operations Centre and assume overall responsibility for the conduct of the maritime search and rescue.

The first units on scene for an offshore incident could range from passing vessels to lifeboats and helicopters. MCA initial response would be: -

* Obtaining and evaluating all relevant information from appropriate sources regarding the incident
* Initiating Distress and Urgency broadcasts as necessary
* Alerting and tasking appropriate search and rescue resources
* Where appropriate, appointing an On-Scene Coordinator to exercise local coordination at the scene of search and rescue operations
* Coordinating the actions of all units involved
* Informing and liaising with all other appropriate authorities including the Emergency Services and advising them of the progress of an incident

Maritime incidents fall broadly into 2 categories, those incidents where the rescue is conducted at sea and those on or just off the coastline.

**6.4.1 Offshore**

The MCA will utilise various means of transport to get Emergency Services personnel to scene. Also, in liaison with the Ambulance Service, MCA will direct the rescue units to ferry survivors or bodies to locations ashore. Once any survivors or bodies are landed ashore they will be handed into the care of the Police or other appropriate agency. It must be acknowledged that survivors/bodies could be landed at multiple locations or landed at locations outside the LRF area, hours or even days after the incident.

**6.4.2 Inshore/Ashore**

The closeness to the shore will result in reduced transit times for rescue units landing survivors/bodies ashore, this could result in reduced warning times to Police/Ambulance. Therefore, HM Coastguard and the person in charge of the rescue unit may decide without consultation with the other Emergency Services, where to land survivors/bodies. The presence of a Liaison Officer from each Emergency Service at the MRCC will reduce this risk.

**6.5 Local Authorities**

The Local Authority or Authorities affected will designate an appropriate person to represent them at the both the SCG and TCG. This person will be part of the strategic or tactical decision making group and assess the support that the Local Authority can provide, both at the scene and elsewhere by liaising with their own internal services.

Using agreed procedures, the required Local Authority staff, voluntary agencies and faith communities will be alerted and requested to respond. An appropriate Local Authority Liaison Officer may be deployed to attend the Forward Command Post (FCP) at the scene and liaise with the Police/Fire Incident Commander.

**7. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION**


Collective management of the scene of a major incident is integral to the success of each agency fulfilling its primary role and responsibilities. Officers on the initial deployment of each emergency service should establish scene management as a joint process as soon as is practicable.

**7.1 Initial Control**

Each emergency service attending the scene will make an assessment, concentrating on the factors which relate directly to their area of operations. This information will be relayed back to their control rooms. It is possible that members of one emergency service, early on in the incident, will spontaneously carry out tasks which are normally the responsibility of another. As soon as sufficient resources arrive, each emergency service can be expected to establish unequivocal command and control of the functions for which it is normally responsible.

**7.2 Command, Control and Coordination Overview**

At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning, the operational level will be activated first, with the other levels, tactical and strategic, being established with the escalation of the incident, or a greater awareness of the situation. It is possible in some incidents, particularly those where there is a threat of a potentially serious problem, that the activation of the three levels will be concurrent. Fundamental to the successful control and coordination of a major incident will be liaison of all emergency and rescue/support services. This will require a recognised and easily understood structure, based on the three levels of command which can be applied to each emergency service or agency. By use of this universal structure, the emergency and support services will be better able to communicate with each other and understand each other’s functions and authority. It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority of service or rank but depict the function carried out by that particular person. At the outset, and before this formal structure is established, it is imperative that the senior officers of each service on the scene, liaise with each other and introduce themselves. This will be the foundation upon which all later meetings will be based. As the incident progresses and more resources attend the RVP, the level of supervision will increase in proportion. As senior managers arrive, they will be assigned functions within the structure. In summary, the roles of each can be described as follows and in figure 3 below:



**7.3 Strategic and SCG reporting**

The Strategic Commander in overall charge of each service is responsible for formulating the strategy for the incident. Each Strategic Commander has overall command of the resources of their own organisation, but will delegate implementation decisions to their respective tactical level commanders. At the earliest opportunity, a strategic group will determine/confirm a specific response strategy and record a strategy statement.

Other than in exceptional circumstances, during a Police led response, the SCC will be situated at Police Headquarters, Middlemoor, Exeter. Although located at Exeter, not all agencies need to be physically present at the SCC, as audio/video conferencing is available.

At the strategic level, major incidents requiring a multi-agency response is coordinated through the SCG. Depending on the incident, the SCG may assign control of specific functions to one or more of the agencies. In extreme circumstances, such as a terrorist attack, it may be necessary for the Police to take executive action in respect of the total incident. ResilienceDirect will be the primary means of information sharing at the SCG and all partners must ensure that any members of their staff who may be involved in the response, have access to ResilienceDirect and know how to use it. Further information about the roles and responsibilities of the Strategic Coordinating Group can be found in the LRF SCC Plan.

<https://www.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/1767/07.-Plans>

The above link on ResilienceDirect is for the SCG SITREP template (Appendix C). It will focus on the strategic dimensions of the emergency and issues arising from that. It will be based on operational reporting, but the strategic issues should not be obscured by operational detail. The template is intended for use in civil emergencies and CT incidents alike. The RAG status reflects a judgement of the situation, progress and likely developments – there is no detailed method or metrics to follow, just a defensible judgement of these three dimensions. Reporting the assessed quality of information, together with source and time is critical.

The primary audience for the SITREP is the SCG. Additional audiences will include DCLG Emergency Room, COBR, neighbouring or otherwise affected SCGs and other stakeholders as required. The SITREP will draw heavily on METHANE and other forms of reports from the tactical and operational levels but these should be summarised to emphasise the strategic issues. The SITREP will usually be drafted in advance of an SCG meeting, then completed and disseminated up/down/sideways as required following the meeting, with agreed actions.

The SCG and its support staff should determine who completes the SITREP but this will normally be the Information Manager. Information for completion will be extracted from the Agency Situation Report (Appendix B) which should be completed at regular intervals by all organisations involved in the incident.

The GLO/GLT will have a role in synthesising strategic information from the completed SITREP for onward transmission to COBR.The template is a starting point for situational reporting at the strategic level**.** The template can be adapted if necessary to fit the specifics of a situation.

**7.4 Tactical**

The Tactical Commander will be located where they can maintain effective tactical command of the operation. This includes consideration of effective joint working with other services and other factors such as access to communications systems. They should attend the scene dependent on these considerations and the nature of the incident. For example, a single contained scene with limited wider impact – more likely to attend scene; multiple scenes or mobile threat and significant wider impact – more likely to command from an established Tactical Coordination Centre. It is essential that the first supervising officers on scene from each of the responding agencies, liaises closely with each other at the earliest opportunity. The multi-agency response at the tactical level is coordinated through the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) and the primary role of the TCG is to deliver the strategy as established by the SCG and to coordinate the activities of operational responders to achieve this. The TCG will normally operate from a location closer to the scene than the SCG. Otherwise, arrangements and considerations for the operation of a TCG are similar to those for an SCG.

**7.5 Operational**

The Operational Commander will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a functional or geographical area and implement direction provided by the Tactical Commander. As the incident progresses and more resources attend the scene, the level of supervision will increase in proportion. The emergency services may appoint a number of Operational Commanders who will perform various supervisory functions depending on the areas of operation designated by the Tactical Commander. Support agency personnel at the scene will carry a Police issued (cordon) pass to identify themselves and wear suitable high visibility clothing.

**7.6 Inter-Agency Resources**

Any Service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances, whilst the supporting Service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other Service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times. Personnel from one Service who help another in this way should only be given tasks for which they are trained and not simply to supplement the other Service in a potentially dangerous situation.

**7.7 Overarching Response Structure**

Details of the operation and coordination of sub-national and national levels for emergency response can be found in the UK Government Concept of Operations and the relevant chapters of Emergency Response and Recovery. The nature and severity of the emergency will determine the need for the involvement of the sub-national and national tiers. The purpose of the national level, whether managed by a Lead Government Department (LGD) or cross-government working conducted through the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), is to address coordination across all relevant government departments and across and between multiple local Strategic Coordinating Groups. This includes the marshalling, prioritisation and allocation of scarce national resources to local control. The invocation of national and sub-national arrangements do not relive or override the local responsibilities of the SCG, which remain unchanged, although their considerations will be informed and influenced by national policies, strategy and coordinating instructions.

**7.8 Rising Tide – Horizon Scanning**

There will be occasions where, through existing monitoring and horizon scanning, LRF partners identify events or situations that although appear some way off, show the potential to impact on a scale that may well require a coordinated strategic response to be considered. The early sharing of such information is essential to allow LRF partners the opportunity to collectively monitor and assess developments as they unfold. This approach maximises the time available for a coordinated strategy and effective planning to be developed, should this become necessary.

**7.9 Rising Tide – Information Sharing and convening a meeting of DCIOS LRF Partners (Operation Link & PEAT**)


See 4.3

**8. SCENE MANAGEMENT**

**8.1 General Considerations**

Collective management of the scene of a Major Incident is integral to the success of each Emergency Service fulfilling its primary roles and responsibilities. Officers on the initial deployment of each service should establish scene management as a joint process as soon, as is practicable.

Every effort should be made to ensure that the Tactical Commanders hold an initial briefing (JESIP Principles). This will enable those Incident Officers to determine the tactics for Command and Control of the incident, to exchange operational information and detail anticipated requirements.

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**8.2 Principles for Joint Working**

[JESIP Aide Memoire](http://www.jesip.org.uk/uploads/resources/All-Staff-Aide-Memoire-web-version.pdf)

[JESIP Commanders Aide Memoire](http://www.jesip.org.uk/uploads/resources/JESIP-Commanders-Aide-Memoire.pdf)

**8.2.1 Co-location**

Co-location of commanders is essential and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination, face-to-face, at a single and easily identified location. This is known as the Forward Command Post (FCP), which is a location near to the scene, where the response is managed. Commanders and functional roles will be identified by tabards worn by individuals.

**8.2.2 Communication**

The sharing of information, free of acronyms, across agency boundaries is essential to operational success. This starts through pre-planning and between Control Rooms prior to deployment of resources. Communication between responders of reliable and accurate critical information about hazards, risks and threats, as well as understanding each organisation’s responsibilities and capabilities underpins the best possible outcomes of an incident. The common symbols and terminology is the national lexicons must be used to communicate common meaning amongst all responders (*See ‘Linked Documents’ section)*

**8.2.3 Coordination**

Coordination involves the integration of priorities, resources, decision making and response activities of each responding agency in order to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and promote successful outcomes. Effective coordination generally requires one agency to act in a ‘lead’ capacity, such as chairing coordination meetings and ensuring an effective response. The lead service will usually be the Police, however in certain circumstances other services/agencies may be a more appropriate choice, depending upon the nature of the emergency, the phase of response and the capabilities required.

**8.2.4 Joint Understanding of Risk**

Risk arises from threats and/or hazards which will be seen, understood and treated differently by different responders. In the context of a joint response, sharing information and understanding about the likelihood and potential impact of risks and the availability and implications of potential control measure will ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the agreed aim and objectives are not compromised. This will include ensuring the safety of responders and mitigating the impact of risks on members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

**8.2.5 Shared Situational Awareness**

This is a common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of the emergency, together with an appreciation of the available capabilities and responding agency’s priorities. Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability in the emergency response and can be achieved by using the Joint Decision Making Model (JDM).



Shared situational awareness relates not only to a common understanding between incident commanders, but also between control rooms and all tiers of the command structure.

It is about having the answers to the following questions:

* What has happened?
* What are the impacts?
* What might happen?
* What are the risks?
* What is being done about it?

**8.3 ARRANGEMENTS AT THE SCENE**

**8.3.1 Cordons**

Cordons should be instituted as soon as possible following consultation with the commanders of other emergency services, in particular the fire and rescue service silver commander, who can advise on the extent of the cordon relative to hazards and health and safety.

The purpose of a cordon is to:

* assist in protecting the scene, the public and those working within the scene
* control unauthorised access
* prevent unauthorised interference with the scene
* facilitate emergency services operations.

Cordon distances and staff requirements for specific locations or high-risk areas may be determined in advance and incorporated into plans. There may be a need to adjust these depending on the event. Personnel deployed on cordons must be briefed on their role and ongoing developments. Resources from other agencies can be asked to assist in staffing a cordon.

**8.3.2**  **Inner Cordon**

This encloses the scene of the incident and contains any area of hazard or contamination. During the [rescue phase](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/civil-contingencies/emergency-procedures/response-and-recovery/#rescue-phase), the area within the inner cordon may be initially the responsibility of the [fire and rescue service](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/civil-contingencies/disaster-victim-identification/#fire-and-rescue-service) working in cooperation with the ambulance service and medical personnel.

Red and white tape designates the inner cordon. The size of the inner cordon is determined by the incident. The normal recommended minimum distances are:

* **100 metres** for a minor explosive risk
* **200 metres** for a moderate explosive risk
* **400 metres** for a serious explosive risk.

If in doubt, cordon off a large area and seek advice from the military explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) experts. Requests for EOD resources should be made to the Joint Services EOD Operations Centre (for which standing ministerial approval also applies). Separate advice is available for CBRN incidents.

All personnel entering and exiting an inner cordon must be recorded for forensic reasons, and so that everyone can be accounted for in the event of an evacuation. When the rescue phase is complete, the police have responsibility for the area enclosed within an inner cordon in order to:

* Recover the deceased and human remains
* Carry out forensic examination of the scene
* Collect evidence on behalf of the Senior investigating officer (SIO) or Senior identification Manager (SIM)

Cordons will be identified as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Tape** | **Area** | **Controlled by:** |
| Red and White | Inner Cordon | Fire and Rescue Service or Police |
| Blue and White | Outer Cordon | Police |

**8.3.3**  **Outer Cordon**

This creates a safe working area for the emergency services and responding agencies. The radius of the cordoned area depends on the type and scope of the incident, the availability of resources and the needs of the community. It is determined by the silver commander in consultation with the other emergency services.

An outer cordon is designated by blue and white tape, preferably clearly marked with the word police. The [scene access control point](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/civil-contingencies/emergency-procedures/response-and-recovery/#scene-access-control-point) and exit point must be staffed (See 7.3.4). Staff must be made aware of who, in addition to the emergency services and other specialist and support personnel, will be arriving. Persons seeking access must be questioned about their identity and why they require access. Within an outer cordon, the use of blue lights should be restricted to ambulances collecting or conveying patients, and designated command vehicles.

Personnel staffing the outer cordon must be alert to the possibility of people trying to gain unauthorised access, particularly through more remote sections of the boundary. Briefings should clearly identify who is permitted through which cordons and [rendezvous points](https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/civil-contingencies/emergency-procedures/response-and-recovery/#rendezvous-points), such as the family and friends reception centre.

In certain circumstances other agencies’ personnel may require urgent access and, therefore, a police escort. For example:

* Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) Inspectors
* Structural Engineers
* Local Authority building control surveyors

**8.3.4 Legal Issues**

Statutory provisions that allow the police to impose and enforce a cordon are contained in the Terrorism Act 2000:

* [section 33](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/33)defines a cordoned area
* [section 34](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/34)gives the power to designate a cordoned area
* [section 35](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/35)explains the duration of a cordon
* [section 36](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/36)defines the police powers in respect of enforcement of a cordoned area by a constable in uniform.

Police community support officers (PCSOs) are authorised to enforce a cordon under the Terrorism Act 2000 as one of their standard powers.

In non-terrorism cases, the authority for the police to set up and regulate a cordon is governed by common law. In general, the police are justified in cordoning off an area:

* to protect public safety
* to prevent an actual or anticipated breach of the peace
* to protect a crime scene
* at the request, and with the consent of, the landowner.

Any person failing to comply with the directions of a police officer deployed to enforce a cordon may be committing an offence under [section 89(2)](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/16/section/89) of the Police Act 1996, namely resisting or willfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of their duty. The powers of arrest under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 apply where appropriate. Fire fighters also have some legal powers under [section 44](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/21/section/44) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 that may be useful in an emergency or major incident.

**8.3.5 Scene Access Control Point**

Generally, there should be only one entry and exit point to the inner cordon, known as the scene access control point. This should be established for both inner and outer cordons and be jointly controlled by the police service and fire and rescue service. Control should be exercised early in an emergency or major incident to ensure that only personnel with a justifiable reason are allowed access.

Police at the scene access control point are responsible for:

* Documenting persons entering the inner cordon, at what time and why, and the time they exit
* Preparing the document and audit trail for the retrieval of deceased and human remains from the scene (records are disclosable and should be made available to the senior investigating officer).

Each emergency service has a responsibility to ensure that their personnel have the correct personal protective equipment when entering the inner cordon and are given an adequate health and safety briefing.

Access through the outer cordon should be via access control points (to distinguish from the scene access control point through the inner cordon). Providing separate entrance and exit points assists traffic flow inside the cordoned area. The requirement to document vehicles and personnel entering the outer cordon is unlikely to be necessary.

Any requests for access through cordons must be directed to the Police Incident Control. Access through the Inner Cordon will be via the Police Cordon Control Point. Police cordons at the scene of an emergency will exist for a number of reasons and those seeking to enter the cordoned area must appreciate that a number of significant issues have to be taken into account by the Police Commander before permitting entry. These include the health and safety of all within the cordoned area, which is frequently an issue that needs to be determined in conjunction with other Category 1 Responders, notably Fire & Rescue and Health Services. This means that a decision to permit entry may not be a simple process. In addition, the Police Commander will have to consider matters of potential interference with evidence at certain scenes and in all cases the responder seeking entry must be able to evidence the good reason upon which they seek to enter.

The following procedure should be adopted by those seeking entry who are not members of the emergency services acting under the direct command and control of their relevant Commander.

The primary method of securing access should be prior application to the relevant representative at the TCC. This should be the agencies own representative in the first instance unless arrangements have previously been made to proceed through an emergency service representative. Entry will be in accordance with the access policy for that incident, set by either the TCC or SCC command groups. This may not be consistent from incident to incident.

Where there is an urgent need for access or no liaison officer is present at the TCC, an approach should be made to the Cordon Control Officer. This officer will assess whether to permit entry within the parameters set out for them by their Command and will respond accordingly. If unable to permit entry, this officer will cause enquiry to be made at TCC Command in respect of entry.

**8.3.6 Rendezvous Point (RvP)**

After initial response, police and emergency services personnel attending an emergency or major incident should be directed to a designated RvP. Each RvP has an appointed RvP officer. This will normally be under the control of a Police Officer. The location should be secure and safe for emergency services personnel to use and be searched prior to use. If an RvP is being established in response to a suspected terrorist incident, it is preferable that it is not an obvious, predetermined location.

**8.3.7 Marshalling Area**

A marshalling area should be established between the RvP and the scene and vehicles requiring access to the scene will be held in this area. The location will be selected after consultation between the Police and Fire and Rescue Service Tactical Commanders. Marshalling areas may also be used to provide briefing/debriefing areas and recuperation for personnel involved in work at the scene. Where practicable a safe area for helicopters to use should be set up adjacent to the Marshalling Area.

**8.3.8 Strategic Holding Areas and Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Areas**

A major incident will require a large number of agencies to work together to make the response as effective as possible at all phases of the incident. A Strategic Holding Area is a pre-identified area large enough to accommodate the Command and Logistical Support structure for a major / catastrophic incident including but not limited to CBRN events incidents. This includes a Marshalling Area where resources can standby or rest whilst awaiting deployment to the incident. Four Locations have been identified in Devon and Cornwall area (see LRF Strategic Holding Area plan for details).

**8.3.9 Control/Command Units**

The emergency services and other agencies’ Incident Command Units will form the focus from which the major incident will be managed. These units will be located close to one another and be known collectively as the Incident Control Post. The Incident Commanders will jointly exercise their authority from this point in a coordinated manner.

To aid identification, the blue, red or green identifying lights on each of the main Incident Command Units of the emergency services will be switched on (unless to do so would be dangerous). The blue lights of all other vehicles must be switched off, except during incidents on open motorways and unless deemed to be necessary elsewhere to avoid accidents. Agencies may be required to provide liaison officers on scene and/or to attend Strategic and Tactical Coordination Centres to provide support.

**8.3.10 National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers (NILO)**

A trained and qualified officer who can advise and support Incident Commanders, police, medical, military and other government agencies on the Fire Rescue Services (FRSs) / Ambulance’s operational capacity and capability to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at which a FRS / Ambulance attendance may be required. The role of the NILO will include:

* Bridge the intelligence and information sharing between partner agencies involved
* Improve inter-agency planning, operational preparedness, liaison and response at emergencies, terrorist related and other critical incidents
* Improve co-operation and understanding amongst agencies on matters of organisational capacity, capability and command
* Reduce risk to the public, operational personnel and environment

**9. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTEROPERABILITY**

The DCIOS LRF Resilient Telecommunications Plan sets out a range of options for communicating in times of telecommunications failure/loss. The LRF Airwave Interoperability standard operating procedure provides ‘blue light services’ with a unified framework for working together that enhances established practices for communications and coordination across the command and control structures.

**9.1 Airwave**

Airwave is the secure and resilient mobile telecommunications system for the Police, Ambulance and Fire and Rescue Services. The system is also available to organisations with whom the emergency services need to communicate in responding to an emergency and spare sets are held within Ops and Contingency Planning, Devon and Cornwall Police. It must be noted that these may take some time to distribute. During a major incident, robust communications are essential at all levels and it is particularly important to ensure that there is continuing liaison between all Tactical Commanders.

**9.2 High Integrity Telecommunications System (HITS)**

HITS provides a resilient telecommunications backbone between SCC’s in Police Force areas and central government crisis management centres. HITS is a satellite-based resilient and independent telecommunications system that will still function when the main networks are unavailable or degraded. The system is accredited to handle OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE voice and data communications. Within Devon and Cornwall there are 4 laptops, 4 phones and a printer, all held at Police Headquarters, Middlemoor, Exeter.

**9.3 Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS)**

MTPAS is intended to preserve access to mobile networks by those engaged in an emergency response when network capacity is under pressure. Privileged access is achieved by installing a special SIM card in the telephone handset. Special SIM cards are only available to entitled users within the responder community and not to members of the public. The LRF capability lead for telecommunications has responsibility for coordinating the scheme in their local resilience area. The scheme can only be activated by the Police Strategic Commander who must notify all the relevant network service providers that an ‘emergency incident’ has occurred and that they want the MTPAS to be activated.

**9.4 Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET)**

RAYNET is a nation-wide voluntary group of qualified radio amateurs who are able to provide emergency radio communications to the emergency services, local authorities and central government departments. RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications across Devon and Cornwall. National and international radio communications can also be provided if requested, as can sending documents and images via their radios in the event of a loss of power. Local groups are based upon a district or Unitary Local Authority area and come under the control of their appropriate County Controller.

**10. CASUALTY RESCUE AND CLEARANCE**

A primary responsibility of the emergency services at a major incident is the recovery, treatment and documentation of casualties. They fall into one of four categories:

a) Uninjured

b) Injured

c) Evacuees

d) Deceased

**10.1 Uninjured**

These people will have been involved in the incident, but will not necessarily want or require medical attention. They must be removed from the hazard to either an Evacuation Assembly Point (EAP) (see section 9.5) or a Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC) (see section 9.7). However, it must be mentioned that they may have been involved in a traumatic experience, and although not requiring medical attention, they should be closely monitored, and if necessary/possible checked by Ambulance and/or medical personnel. They may also be witnesses to the incident and the Police will need to collate their details for the benefit of the Casualty Information Bureau as well as the Senior Investigating Officer – this can be done at the Survivor Reception Centre.

**10.2 Injured**

Casualty Triage and Documentation – All casualties must be prioritised and labelled in accordance with the nationally accepted casualty triage label or slapper band. Ambulance services adopt a triage system at a mass casualty incident and label casualties with the following codes:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Priority | Description | Colour |
| 1 | Immediate | Red |
| 2 | Urgent | Yellow |
| 3 | Delayed | Green |
| Dead | Deceased | Black |

**10.3 Evacuees**

Some Emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. Evacuation is primarily a Police role, usually on the advice of Fire & Rescue Service and in consultation with the Local Authority, but circumstances may need to involve personnel from several agencies.

Plymouth and Exeter both have city centre evacuation plans, available via ResilienceDirect, which should be activated when dealing with emergencies within the city centre boundary areas.

High Risk Community plans are also available in relation to flooding incidents and these give further details of premises identified as at risk.

**10.4 Deceased**

The deceased should not be moved unless that is the only way of reaching a live casualty, or if the deceased is likely to deteriorate due to environmental hazards such as fire. The deceased should be otherwise left in situ and it is the responsibility of the police until the evidence gathering stage begins.

HM Coroner has a duty to investigate a death if they have reason to suspect, the deceased died a violent or unnatural death; the cause of death is unknown; or the deceased died whilst in custody or state detention. The Coroner needs to ascertain, who the deceased was; how, when and where the deceased came by their death and any other particulars that may be required for registration of the death or from the findings of an inquest.

If required (e.g. a mass fatalities incident) a specialist Police team for body recovery and identification, Disaster Victim Identification Team (DVIT) may be utilised to assist in this process. Once recovered, bodies will be removed in the first instance to a Victim Holding Audit area where they will be held awaiting transfer to the mortuary facility.

All the emergency services have a legal obligation to HM Coroner to provide evidential continuity of the handling of a dead body from its location at the incident through its recovery, to the post mortem examination.

All the emergency services have a legal obligation to HM Coroner to provide evidential continuity of the handling of a dead body from its location at the incident through its recovery, to the post mortem examination.

**10.5 Evacuation Assembly Point (EAP)**

The Police, in conjunction with the Fire Service (if appropriate), will identify as many EAPs as necessary to achieve a controlled and coordinated evacuation of the area. They will advise the relevant Local Authority which locations will be used as early as possible. All Evacuation Assembly Points will be managed by the Police, who will be assisted by other relevant organisations.

EAPs may be external places from which to set up transport to local authority led rest centres or may be places of safety, such as a village hall. The police remain responsible for evacuees until such time as the relevant local authority is able to set up a rest centre to support the evacuees for the duration of the emergency. In some circumstances LAs may decide to adopt an EAP from the Police, or to place evacuees into hotels or B&B accommodation.

The decision to evacuate is taken by the Police; however other key organisations are consulted with. The Health Authority in particular may have to assess the needs of all vulnerable people (the young, elderly and those with special needs e.g. pregnant women) within the evacuation area. The Fire Brigade also have a great deal of information on which to base assessments as do the Environment Agency.

The decision to evacuate is therefore not taken lightly. It may be safer for people to stay and shelter inside if there is an airborne hazard. In such cases the advice is to GO IN, STAY IN, and TUNE IN. In these circumstances the public would be requested to go indoors and shut all doors and windows and to remain inside until the danger had passed. The Police would request messages for those within an affected area to be broadcast by the media. These would include information on the current situation and when the public could expect to receive the 'all clear'.

**10.6 Rest Centre**

A Rest Centre is the responsibility of the Local Authority to open, manage and staff, and can be defined as a place where evacuated persons can receive temporary shelter, warmth and refreshments. Welfare services, basic care, information, and overnight accommodation may also be required for up to 72 hours.

The responding LA has approximately 2hrs from the time they are informed that a rest centre is required to put in place arrangements. It is essential that the Police/Fire alert the relevant local authority if a rest centre is, or may be, required as early as possible during the evacuation process to allow them time to put in place the necessary support arrangements and staffing.

**10.7 Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC)**

The SuRC is a secure area established, set up and managed by a Police Major Disaster Room Manager (MDRM). It is a place where survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid. Information will usually be gathered by Police documentation teams, who record survivors’ details for the purpose of Casualty Bureau procedures. The longer-term welfare requirements of survivors will be met through the other assistance centres if set up, or through partner agencies involved in the recovery process.

Top tier LAs support the police with the provision of the welfare function, assisted by the voluntary sector and faith teams.

A SuRC will normally open within 2 hours and will be open for up to 48-72 hours and may be within the outer cordon managed by police.

**10.8 Family and Friends Reception Centre**

The decision to establish a Family and Friends Reception Centre will normally be taken by the Tactical Commander in consultation with SCG and the relevant local authority. Police are the lead authority and will identify and set up suitable premises to support the families and friends of those affected. The LA will support the Police with the welfare function working alongside Health, voluntary organisations and faith teams to ensure appropriate support services are input.

It is a secure place where the family and friends of people directly involved in the incident can receive initial support and advice. The FFRC will be established to help reunite families and friends with survivors and will provide a capacity to register, interview and shelter those in attendance.  Any commercial, industrial accident will require consultation and the provision of assistance from an identified representative, for example the Rail Incident Care Teams (if a rail incident).

Families and friends of the deceased or survivors should be directed to the FFRC. The Centre will be opened as soon as possible and in any event within 12 hours of the incident. The Police have trained MDRMs to ensure a secure environment for the necessary information gathering and handling. Later in the incident, the FFRC may evolve into a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) run by local authorities. Police involvement may still be required.

**10.9 Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC)**

It is the responsibility of the LA to set up an HAC, which will provide a one-stop-shop for survivors, family and friends and all those impacted by the emergency through which they can access support, care and advice. The relevant LA will need to find a suitable location close to public transport and facilities which must be fit for purpose within 48-72 hours from the time that SCG agrees that one will be required.

The HAC will:

* Act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved families, friends and survivors and, where appropriate, to anyone else who has been affected
* Enable those affected to gain as much information as is currently available about missing family members and friends
* Enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enhances the ability to identify loved ones quickly
* Offer a range of facilities that will allow families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs
* Ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that should minimise duplication.

Representatives from all the relevant organisations will be involved within the HAC, such as social care services, housing, benefits, environmental health and building safety, alongside voluntary organisations (such as the Citizens Advice Bureau, British Red Cross, Salvation Army, St John Ambulance, and Age Concern), faith teams, HM Coroner’s Officer, the police, and NHS Devon.

An HAC can be open for days, weeks, months or years in some form. It may decrease in size or become virtual, dependent on requirement.

**10.10 Evacuation Staging Area (ESA)**

**I**n the event of a large scale evacuation (involving the movement of up to thousand+ people) an ESA may be set up by the Police, supported by other organisations. ESA’s might include large sheltered areas with plenty of capacity externally to allow for coach drop-off and parking for the public, staff and the emergency services.

ESA’s will act as short-term places of refuge and shelter prior to dispersing evacuees within or out of the county, or for receiving them into it from another LRF area.

Evacuation is always the last resort.

**10.11 Casualty Bureau**

Police will provide a Casualty Bureau, which is the only place that will accurately collate details of dead, surviving and evacuated people. Bureau staff will receive other detailed information from the scene, the Survivor Reception Centre, Hospitals, the Mortuary and Rest Centres. At the same time, enquiries will be received from relatives of persons who are believed to be involved in the incident. They will sort, collate and search enquiry, casualty and survivor records in order to match casualties with people about whom enquiries have been made.

**ONLY THE POLICE CAN RELEASE DETAILS OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED OR INJURED FOLLOWING RELEASE OF DETAILS TO NEXT OF KIN.**

**11.0 Vetting**

There is an expectation that all organisations should carry out a minimum of Baseline Standard (BS) of their staff and to ensure only BS clearance staff are put forward for LRF/SCG/TCG duties.  BS clearance is accepted as being sufficient and allows access to official sensitive (or lower) and the occasional controlled access to secret.  BS is a very basic check and can be done internal without the assistance of an external party.

Security Check (SC) is the level above BS and allows longer term access to secret. Although recommended for certain staff members who may (for example) be working with the National Risk Assessment (malicious threat) it is not a necessity.

Police Gold Commanders who take the role of SCG Chair for a threat related incident will endeavour to communicate as much as they can so responders can deliver their duties in a multi-agency environment. This will be done on a ‘need to know’ basis regardless of the vetting level of partners involved in the meeting.

**Appendix A**

**LEAD AGENCY HANDOVER DOCUMENT**



Operation *Insert Name*

*Insert Location*

*Insert Date of Incident*

**Lead Responder**

**Handover Document**

In line with the agreed Combined Agencies Emergency Response Protocol, established by the Devon, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Local Resilience Forum, Devon & Cornwall Police assumed responsibility as the lead co-ordinating agency from the time this incident occurred on the *Insert date of incident.*

Devon & Cornwall Police has continued in that role during the RESPONSE process of reaction, rescue and retrieval phases of the incident. Devon & Cornwall Police has now completed the retrieval phase to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Therefore, in accordance with the above protocol, Devon & Cornwall Police now relinquishes the role of lead co-ordinating agency, which is passed to the relevant local authority. Asfrom the time and date shown below, *Insert name of relevant Local Authority,* are now responsible for the co-ordination of the RECOVERY process of relief, remediation and regeneration phases of the incident.

|  |  |
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| Signed on behalf of  Devon & Cornwall Police | Signed on behalf of the  Insert name of relevant Local Authority |

**Time……………………………… Date……………………………….**

*Please note that the highest level of command currently present during this incident must sign-off the sheet e.g. if SCG is operational then its members should approve and not TCG.*

**Appendix B**

**AGENCY SITUATION REPORT**

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| **DESCRIPTION** |
| *This report is organised in such a way to assist in the creation of the summary SCG SITREP document. Please complete the details and update specifically prior to the TCG/SCG meetings* |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **AGENCY DETAILS** | | | |
| **AGENCY NAME:** |  | **REPORT NO:** | ***001*** |
| **COMPLETED BY:** |  | **TIME OF ISSUE** |  |
| **CONTACT DETAILS:** |  | | |

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| --- |
| **AGENCY SITUATION REPORTS TO INCLUDE SUMMARIES OF:**   * Direct and wider impacts * The operational response * Significant risks, emerging issues * Assumptions and critical uncertainties * Forward look * Other resilience issues arising * RAG status explanation * Point of contact and time/date of last update/check of the information |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **RAG Status** | **AMBER** | **UPDATE** |
| **SITUATION** | |  |
| **RESPONSE** | |  |
| **FORWARD LOOK** | |  |

**RAG status**

* The RAG status is an honest and defensible appraisal of three dimensions of the emergency: a) the situation, b) the response to it and c) foreseeable developments.
* The three dimensions are separated but are combined into a single indicator, and in the absence of a prescribed method of doing so, the RAG status will reflect the collective judgement of the Agency. This will be reflected on the SCG SITREP.
* There is no merit in ‘talking up’ or taking an unrealistically optimistic view of where things stand and how they are projected to develop.
* The relevant text entry should adequately explain the RAG status given.
* Indicators of the three levels are defined as follows:

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| **RED** | **SITUATION:** The incident is having a strategically significant impact; normal community business has been significantly affected.  **RESPONSE:** The response is at or has exceeded the limits of capacity or capability, and further resources are required.  **FORWARD LOOK:** The situation is expected to either get worse or remain at this level for the short to medium term. |
| **AMBER** | **SITUATION:** The incident is having a moderate impact with issues of strategic concern; normal community business has been affected, but the situation is being effectively managed.  **RESPONSE:** The response is being managed, at this time, within current resources and through the activation of local contingency plans and/or coordinated corrective action; mutual aid might be required in the short to medium term.  **FORWARD LOOK:** The situation is not expected to get any worse in the short to medium term although some disruption will continue. |
| **GREEN** | **SITUATION:** There is limited or no strategic impact from the incident; normal community business has largely returned or is continuing.  **RESPONSE:** Ongoing response is being managed locally, and within the capacity of pre-planned resources.  **FORWARD LOOK:** The situation is expected to improve with residual disruption being managed. |

**Reporting provenance and quality**

* The source/time and assessed quality of information should be clearly and prominently reported.
* Where critical uncertainties (i.e. factors that are unknown, but which have the potential to strategically alter the situation if they become known) exist they should be clearly identified and associated risks set out.

**Defining concepts and terms for common understanding**

* Where common understanding of a concept or term is necessary for shared situational awareness it should be clearly explained.
* Common understanding of terms cannot be assumed – terms should be defined.
* Where agreed definitions exist these should normally be adopted and explained (e.g. there is a definition of ‘flood’ in the Water Flood and Water Management Act 2010).

Acronyms and abbreviations should be minimised, and always explained at their first use in every issue of the SITREP.

**Appendix C**

**STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (SCG) SITUATION REPORT**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **EVENT/INCIDENT** |  | | |
| **DATE & TIME** |  | | |
| **SCG CHAIR** | *(name and contact details)* | | |
| **SITREP POINT OF CONTACT** | *(name and contact details for amendments / collation)* | **SITREP No.** |  |

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| **SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETION OF THE TEMPLATE (REMOVE WHEN COMPLETE)** |
| *Annex Two contains detailed guidance notes, but please observe the following key points in completing the SITREP template:*   * *This SITREP will focus on the strategic dimensions of the emergency and issues arising from that. It will be based on operational reporting, but the strategic issues should not be obscured by operational detail.* * *The template is intended for use in civil emergencies and CT incidents alike.* * *The RAG status will reflect a judgement of the situation, progress and likely developments – there is no detailed method or metrics to follow, just a defensible judgement of these three dimensions.* * *Reporting the assessed quality of information, together with source and time is critical.* * *Where images (e.g. maps) and tables (e.g. progress against key indicators) support situational awareness they will usually be appended in annexes.* |

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| **SITUATION OVERVIEW** |
| *A concise and strategic overview of the situation, its impacts and implications. This should be written as paragraph of text or using a few bullet points, and will draw on the operational (METHANE – see annex one) reporting, but emphasise the strategic dimensions and issues.* |

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| **SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE** |
| *A concise overview of the operational response, drawing attention to any current or foreseen resource or capability issues. This should also summarise the Command, Control and Coordination (C3) arrangements that have been established.* |

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| **FORWARD LOOK** |
| *A summary of possible developments, emerging risks and critical uncertainties that have potential strategic implications for the response and recovery effort.* |

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| **RESOURCE ISSUES** |
| *A summary of current and foreseeable resource and capability issues, highlighting any potential or possible requirements for assistance, for example mutual aid between responders or through MACA.* |

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| **STRATEGY** | |
| Working strategy | *A course of action integrating ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives.* |
| Overarching aim | *A short, precise and measurable statement of the overall end state you want to achieve. Influenced by, and consistent with, overarching policy.* |
| Objectives | *A list of steps, phases or tasks that have to be completed in order to achieve the overarching, strategic aim.* |
| Public comms strategy | *A statement of intent and brief description of the course of action to inform and communicate with the public.* |

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| **AGENCY SITUATION REPORTS TO INCLUDE SUMMARIES OF:**   * Direct and wider impacts * The operational response * Significant risks, emerging issues * Assumptions and critical uncertainties * Forward look * Other resilience issues arising * RAG status explanation * Point of contact and time/date of last update/check of the information |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Emergency Services** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Police | **R A G** |  |
| Fire | **R A G** |  |
| Ambulance | **R A G** |  |
| Maritime & Coastguard Agency | **R A G** |  |
| Other | **R A G** |  |

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| **Local Authority(ies)** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Local Authority NAME  Department NAME | **R A G** |  |
| Local Authority NAME  Department NAME | **R A G** |  |

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| **Health** | **RAG Status** |  |
| NHS England | **R A G** |  |
| Public Health England | **R A G** |  |

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| --- | --- | --- |
| **Met Office** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Current situation | **R A G** |  |
| Forecast | **R A G** |  |
| Likely impacts and risks arising | **R A G** |  |

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| **Environment Agency** | **RAG Status** | **Note: For pluvial and groundwater flooding the Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) will also be involved and reporting** |
| Current situation | **R A G** |  |
| Forecast | **R A G** |  |
| Likely impacts and risks arising | **R A G** |  |

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| **Animal & Plant Health Agency** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Current situation | **R A G** |  |
| Forecast | **R A G** |  |
| Likely impacts and risks arising | **R A G** |  |

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| **Transport** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Highways England | **R A G** |  |
| Highways Authority (see LA) | **R A G** |  |
| Network Rail | **R A G** |  |
| British Transport Police | **R A G** |  |
| Train Operating Company | **R A G** |  |
| Other | **R A G** |  |

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| **Utilities** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Electricity | **R A G** |  |
| Gas | **R A G** |  |
| Water | **R A G** |  |
| Telecoms | **R A G** |  |
| Other | **R A G** |  |

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| **Voluntary Sector** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Organisation NAME | **R A G** |  |
| Organisation NAME | **R A G** |  |

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| **Military** | **RAG Status** |  |
| Overview | **R A G** |  |
| By unit or by capability area | **R A G** | Capability areas would for example include logistic support, EOD (explosives), engineering or air support. |

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| **Summary of other involved groups** | **RAG Status** |  |
| STAC | **R A G** |  |
| Humanitarian Assistance | **R A G** |  |
| Recovery Group | **R A G** |  |
| Other | **R A G** |  |

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| **Other Responders** | **RAG Status** | **Note when other org’s are involved, their input will usually be included in the report of their ‘sponsoring organisation’** |
| Organisation NAME | **R A G** |  |
| Organisation NAME | **R A G** |  |

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| **ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION, RESPONSE EFFORTS AND PROGRESS** |
| *This should reflect the perception, established from a range of sources including social media, of different public and community groups, including residents, businesses and those who are indirectly as well directly affected by events.* |

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| **PUBLIC AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE** |
| *This should cover:*   1. ***Key messages*** *being issued, in line with the public communications strategy;* 2. *Means being employed to* ***send*** *key messages to public and community groups;* 3. *Means being employed to* ***receive*** *communications from public and community groups.* |

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| **OTHER ISSUES NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE** |
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| **DATE AND TIME OF NEXT SITREP UPDATE** |  |